/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include #include #include #include #include /* * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. * * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. * * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. * * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that * from C via asm(".include ") but let's not go there. */ #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ /* * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. */ #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 771: \ call 772f; \ 773: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 773b; \ 772: \ call 774f; \ 775: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the * alternatives. */ .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE .Lannotate_\@: .pushsection .discard.nospec .long .Lannotate_\@ - . .popsection .endm /* * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline * builds. */ .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE .Lannotate_\@: .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@ .popsection .endm /* * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call. * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE * invocation below less ugly. */ .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req call .Ldo_rop_\@ .Lspec_trap_\@: pause lfence jmp .Lspec_trap_\@ .Ldo_rop_\@: mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP) ret .endm /* * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg * returns to the instruction after the macro. */ .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req jmp .Ldo_call_\@ .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@: RETPOLINE_JMP \reg .Ldo_call_\@: call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@ .endm /* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 * attack. */ .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE #else jmp *\reg #endif .endm .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE #else call *\reg #endif .endm /* * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP * monstrosity above, manually. */ .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ \ftr .Lskip_rsb_\@: #endif .endm #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ "999:\n\t" \ ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \ ".long 999b - .\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "999:\n\t" \ ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \ _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined. */ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ ALTERNATIVE_2( \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ "lfence;\n" \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ /* * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET * here, anyway. */ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ ALTERNATIVE_2( \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ " jmp 904f;\n" \ " .align 16\n" \ "901: call 903f;\n" \ "902: pause;\n" \ " lfence;\n" \ " jmp 902b;\n" \ " .align 16\n" \ "903: lea 4(%%esp), %%esp;\n" \ " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \ " ret;\n" \ " .align 16\n" \ "904: call 901b;\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ "lfence;\n" \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #endif #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n" # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #endif /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED, SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL, SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ enum ssb_mitigation { SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE, SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE, SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL, SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP, }; extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; /* * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE unsigned long loops; asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) "910:" : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : : "memory" ); #endif } static __always_inline void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature) { asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature]) : : "c" (msr), "a" ((u32)val), "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)), [feature] "i" (feature) : "memory"); } static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB; alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); } /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction * before calling into firmware. * * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.) */ #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ do { \ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \ \ preempt_disable(); \ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ } while (0) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ do { \ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \ \ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); #include /** * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability * * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the * instruction is executed. */ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) { static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS; /* * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to * documentation. The register-operand variant does not. * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable * data segment is the fastest variant. * * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF. */ asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc"); } /** * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability * * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled */ static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void) { if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); } /** * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability * * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled */ static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void) { if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ /* * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence * for the following assembly: * * With retpolines configured: * * callq do_rop * spec_trap: * pause * lfence * jmp spec_trap * do_rop: * mov %rax,(%rsp) * retq * * Without retpolines configured: * * jmp *%rax */ #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \ EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \ /* spec_trap: */ \ EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \ EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \ EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \ /* do_rop: */ \ EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */ \ EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ #else # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \ EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0); /* jmp *%rax */ #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */